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SPECIAL ISSUE INTRODUCTION
Values of happiness 
Harry Walker, London School of Economics 
and Political Science
Iza Kavedžija, University of Oxford
How people conceive of happiness reveals much about who they are and the values they 
hold dear. The modern conception of happiness as private good feeling is the result of a 
long sequence of changes in dominant conceptions of the ends of life and of humanity’s 
place in the cosmos. This invites reflection on how the very vagueness of happiness can 
account for its powerful claim to render diverse values commensurable. In arguing for the 
importance of a critical, ethnographic approach to happiness— one concerned less with 
gauging how happy people are than with how happiness figures as an idea, mood, or motive 
in everyday life—we highlight its relationship to values, as well as questions of scope, virtue, 
and responsibility. Whether real or elusive, the pursuit of happiness structures time in 
specific ways and is largely other-oriented, insofar as one’s own happiness would seem best 
left in the hands of others. 
Keywords: happiness, values, moral judgment, wellbeing, moral moods, purpose in life, 
temporality 
“Tell me how you define happiness, and I’ll tell you who you are!” So concludes one 
survey of the concept’s treatment by Western philosophy over the past two mil-
lennia (S. Bok 2010: 54), testifying not only to the diversity of ways in which hap-
piness has been understood—even just within our own intellectual heritage—but 
also, and more importantly, to its role as what we might term a diagnostic of forms 
of life. How people conceive of, evaluate, and pursue (or not) happiness can reveal 
much about how they live and the values they hold dear. An ethnographic inquiry 
into happiness, we argue, offers a unique window onto the ways in which people 
diversely situated in time and space grapple with fundamental questions about how 
to live, the ends of life, and what it means to be human. 
The idea of happiness—however defined in its specifics—makes a claim 
about what is most desirable and worthwhile in a person’s life. It purports to be 
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an all-inclusive assessment of a person’s condition, either at a specific moment in 
time or in relation to a life in its entirety; it expresses a hope that the various aims, 
enjoyments, and desires that characterize a life—though they may often conflict 
with each other—may ultimately be harmonized, or somehow rendered coherent 
(White 2006). For most people in the West today, happiness is about feeling good; 
it denotes a preponderance of positive over negative affect, and a general sense 
of contentment or satisfaction with life. It is inherently subjective, consisting of 
people’s evaluations of their own life, both affective and cognitive (Diener 1984; 
Argyle, Martin, and Crossland 1989). This is, of course, but one of many ways in 
which the term has been understood—and, like all others, says much about the 
social, economic, and political conditions in which it emerged. 
Insofar as the study of happiness necessarily draws together considerations of 
meaning, values, and affect, it could be seen to lie at the very heart of the anthro-
pological endeavor. Indeed, while the term itself has only very recently returned to 
fashion in academic circles, there is a real sense in which the underlying questions 
in which it deals have long been subjected to the ethnographic gaze: about the di-
verse ends that people pursue and how they seek fulfillment; about the structure of 
motivation and action; about the relationship between the sensuous and the moral. 
Since Durkheim, anthropologists have recognized that people are generally happi-
est in those moments when they feel most connected to others—hence, perhaps, 
the overwhelming interest in the ebb and flow of kinship, not to mention the power 
of those liminal moments in which social barriers melt away to produce an inte-
grated, often joyful sense of communitas (see also Freeman, Walker, Robbins, this 
collection). Anthropologists have also long been acutely aware of the diversity of 
ends for which people strive, many of which may stand in a complex relationship 
to happiness (reproducing the lineage, say, or attaining the status of ancestorhood); 
not to mention their passion for engaging in a bewildering variety of projects and 
practices, from the Nuer’s enthusiasm for oxen to the fervor of the kula ring (cf. 
Lambek 2008: 143). As Marshall Sahlins (2006) pointed out, moreover, there is 
more than one possible “road to affluence,” because there exists more than one way 
of narrowing the gap between human wants and the means to satisfy them. And on 
the whole, desiring little would seem more conducive to living well than producing 
much in order to meet escalating material desires.
Given its unique ability to unravel what matters most to people and why, the rela-
tive silence of anthropology in the face of the recent “happiness turn” (Ahmed 2010) 
in the social sciences is all the more striking. As the most cursory glance reveals, the 
topic of happiness has achieved an extraordinary prominence over the course of the 
past decade, not only in academic research, but also in popular and public discourse. 
Bhutan’s now-famous “Gross National Happiness” index has been widely heralded 
as an alternative to gross national product and other conventional measures of pros-
perity and growth for arriving at policy decisions and measuring progress; the idea 
has captured the attention of governments around the world,1 and indeed the United 
1. In Britain, for example, Prime Minister David Cameron has identified happiness as a 
“key challenge” for politicians everywhere, and he announced in November 2010 that 
it would be a major governmental objective to be regularly measured in the national 
statistics (BBC 2006).
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Nations General Assembly has now passed a resolution that happiness should have a 
greater role in development policy, encouraging member states “to pursue the elabo-
ration of additional measures that better capture the importance of the pursuit of 
happiness and well-being” (United Nations News Service 2011).
Placing happiness at the center of public policy is not, of course, a new idea; 
after all, the pursuit of happiness is famously enshrined in the French Constitution 
and the US Declaration of Independence. Bentham’s utilitarian “science of happi-
ness” was intended to be a means by which governments could measure the ex-
pected pleasures and pains resulting from policy proposals and select those that 
would produce the greatest net happiness. His ideas, though influential, were not 
adopted at the time in part because of the obvious difficulties of directly measuring 
something as intangible as happiness. In recent decades, however, psychologists 
and economists have made increasingly sophisticated attempts to overcome this 
problem, producing ever more refined sets of instruments and techniques, with 
ever more influence on governmental policy. 
At the very heart of their methodology lies the deceptively simple procedure 
of asking people more or less directly, in the context of a survey or questionnaire, 
how happy they are; or how satisfied they feel overall with the lives they lead.2 
Such a procedure is useful because it produces results that are easily quantifiable, 
and which lend themselves to systematic comparison. Nevertheless, the potential 
limitations of such a method should immediately also be apparent, perhaps espe-
cially to an anthropologist. We may well ask: Just how reliable are such responses, 
and what exactly do they reveal? As Sara Ahmed has pointed out, the model of 
subjectivity on which this research relies is a quite specific and somewhat peculiar 
one, “where one knows how one feels, and where the distinction between good and 
bad feeling is secure, forming the basis of subjective as well as social well-being” 
(2010: 6). What do people really understand by happiness anyway? Why should we 
assume respondents are all talking about the same thing? What if happiness means 
vastly different things from one place to the next, perhaps to the extent that the 
meanings contradict one other? 
There are still broader concerns: Even if we could identify precisely what is 
meant by the term, is happiness really the best or most desirable goal? It has been 
suggested by some that happiness as such is illusory, or at best a side-effect; indeed, 
that pursuing happiness directly can only lead to further unhappiness, especially 
2. The “happiness turn” has probably made the greatest impact in the fields of economics 
and psychology, with increasing numbers of economists proposing happiness indices 
and self-reported wellbeing as alternatives to measurements such as income or gross 
national product; and with growing interest among psychologists in “mental health” 
rather than illness, including the development of positive psychology. Both groups tend 
to measure “subjective wellbeing,” which is often used synonymously with happiness or 
as a broader measure which encompasses it. Involving both cognitive judgments and 
affective reactions, measurements of subjective wellbeing typically try to capture both 
the momentary pleasurable sensation and an evaluation of one’s life as a whole (for an 
overview of measures see S. Bok 2010: 33–34). Typical survey questions might include 
the following: “Overall, how happy did you feel yesterday?” “How much purpose does 
your life have?” “How satisfied with are you with your life these days, on a scale of 0 to 
10 where 0 is ‘not at all’ and 10 is ‘completely satisfied’?” 
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when it becomes a kind of duty (e.g., Bruckner 2011). In any case, what about other 
desirable goals for policy—or grassroots struggles for that matter—such as free-
dom, equality, or social justice? Why is maximizing happiness a better aim than, 
say, alleviating poverty or enhancing “capabilities” (e.g., Sen 2008)?3 In a trenchant 
critique of the “happiness industry,” William Davies (2015) decries the fact that a 
particular concept of happiness as something objective, measurable, and capable 
of being administered is rapidly gaining currency among the global elite, as well 
as increasing numbers of policy makers and managers, and mobilized in ways that 
potentially expand forms of surveillance and social control. He suggests that the 
current concern with happiness grows out of a particular scientific utopia originat-
ing in the Enlightenment, but gaining real traction in the late nineteenth century, 
in which “core questions of morality and politics will be solvable with an adequate 
science of human feelings” (ibid.: Loc114). A promise, that is, that a science of 
subjective feeling will prove the ultimate tool for working out how to act, both 
morally and politically. It must be emphasized, though, that the aim of making 
public policy “scientific”—and thus divorced from any specific moral or ideological 
foundation—is not without practical consequences, and—as we argue below—is 
certainly not apolitical.
The rapid spike of interest in happiness over the past decade or so would 
also seem to have much to do with the nature of twenty-first-century capitalism. 
Western economies increasingly depend on psychological and emotional engage-
ment with work and commerce, but find this ever more difficult to sustain in a con-
text of rising inequality and alienation. At the same time, increasingly sophisticated 
consumer technologies for monitoring and quantifying people’s moods and feel-
ings are enlarging the opportunities for surveillance and “expert administration” of 
their lives, and beginning to generate the promise of a new, “post-neoliberal era,” in 
which the market is no longer the primary tool for this capture of mass sentiment 
(Davies 2015: Loc172). The techniques of positive psychology are thus mobilized 
in order to bring emotions and wellbeing within broader calculations of economic 
efficiency. 
Whether for these or other concerns, anthropologists have had little to con-
tribute to these prominent debates. There is a certain suspicion of happiness as 
an essentially bourgeois preoccupation, increasingly associated with a neoliberal 
agenda, and potentially at odds with emancipatory politics. To this we might also 
add that the discipline has often gravitated toward more “negative” forms of human 
experience, such as suffering, pain, or poverty (Thin 2008; Robbins 2013a). As a 
result, to the extent that “cultural” factors, including issues of translation and com-
parison, are taken seriously in the wider cross-disciplinary literature, discussions 
tend to be dominated by cultural psychologists and economists, who often have 
a more quantitative orientation, and may prefer to direct efforts toward refining 
3. Robert Nozick (1990: 117) writes: “We want experiences, fitting ones, of profound con-
nection with others, of deep understanding of natural phenomena, of love, of being 
profoundly moved by music or tragedy, or doing something new and innovative, expe-
riences very different from the bounce and rosiness of the happy moments”. 
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the questionnaires used to gauge levels of happiness in a population.4 We firmly 
believe that disengagement from one of the most important and high-profile recent 
developments in cross-disciplinary research and public debate would be a grave 
error. While beyond the scope of this introduction, many of the findings of hap-
piness studies—from both cultural psychology and economics—are of significant 
interest and relevance for anthropology, as Neil Thin (2012) has shown at length in 
his excellent overview. It is important to note that the methods and techniques of 
happiness research have already been subjected to extensive critical scrutiny, with 
many of the most thoroughgoing and elaborate criticisms coming from within the 
field itself.5 Moreover, some practitioners have explicitly tried to encourage more 
input from anthropologists, acknowledging the need for—and possible advantages 
of—more nuanced ethnographic approaches (e.g., Diener and Suh 2000; Suh and 
Oishi 2004: 221). While our approach does not preclude critique, nor does it take 
critique to be the paramount goal; our intention is to open up rather than foreclose 
debate with happiness studies, engaging the field on our terms, but in a construc-
tive and inclusive manner. 
The approach we pursue in this collection is thus ethnographic, first and fore-
most. Owing to the sheer volume of work on the topic, we felt it especially impor-
tant to develop an approach from the ground up, as it were, led by ethnography 
rather than the findings and assumptions of other disciplines, for it is precisely in 
this way that anthropology might have something genuinely original and interest-
ing to contribute to cross-disciplinary discussions and debates. It is significant that 
none of the contributors to this volume employed the strategy of asking people 
directly about happiness as a central part of their research. This may be, in the end, 
what most distinguishes our approach from that adopted by the happiness studies 
community. Needless to say, while this avoids some of the problems faced by stud-
ies reliant on self-reporting, it raises other problems of its own. One is that we are 
simply unable to contribute to the vast enterprise of gauging comparative levels of 
happiness around the world, or indeed quantifying in any way “how happy” people 
are. The problem of how we can know or infer (let alone describe) the internal 
psychological states of others has gained renewed attention in recent years, espe-
cially in light of recognition that in some cultural contexts, the concealment of one’s 
“true” thoughts or emotions may be deemed desirable or inevitable (see, e.g., Rob-
bins and Rumsey 2008; Keane 2015: 125). Our focus here, then, is not on gauging 
or comparing levels of happiness, but on how happiness figures as an idea, mood, 
or motive in people’s day-to-day lives: how they actually go about making their 
lives happier—or not—whether consciously or otherwise, in ways conditioned by 
dominant social values as well as an array of aims and aspirations that are poten-
tially conflicting. 
4. For discussions of intercultural differences in the constitutive elements of happiness, 
beyond the apparently differing “levels” of happiness reported, see, for example, Mishra 
(1994); Camfield et al. (2009); Kan, Karasawa, and Kitayama (2009); Bull et al. (2010); 
Lu (2010); Oishi et al. (2013).
5. For an overview of some of these problems, see D. Bok (2010: 30–37). The validity of 
measures is discussed at some length by Dolan and Peasgood (2010).
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While happiness is not necessarily an easy topic for anthropology, given its no-
toriously elusive quality, we hope to show why it is nevertheless an important and 
promising one. In what follows, we direct attention to a number of themes we con-
sider particularly relevant to an ethnographic approach, including considerations 
of scope, virtue, and responsibility in gauging how happiness is conceptualized and 
how it comes to figure in people’s actions and judgments; the link between hap-
piness and values; the nature of happiness as a moral mood; and, finally, issues of 
temporal orientation, including senses of happiness as a receding horizon, a pursuit 
or promise more virtual than actual, ever so slightly out of one’s grasp. 
Questions of happiness 
Despite the general dearth of dedicated ethnographic treatments, the past few years 
have witnessed the emergence of a handful of engagements with happiness and 
the related topic of wellbeing from an anthropological perspective (e.g., Corsín Ji-
ménez 2008a; Berthon et al. 2009; Mathews and Izquierdo 2009a; Miles-Watson 
2010; Jackson 2011, 2013; Johnston 2012; Thin 2012; Fischer 2015).6 These works 
suggest—contrary to the assumptions of some social scientific researchers—that 
there is no single or unified “pursuit of happiness”; or as Gordon Mathews and 
Carolina Izquierdo put it, “Happiness is not one thing; it means different things 
in different places, different societies, and different cultural contexts” (2009b: 1). 
This conclusion finds increasing support from the work of cultural psychologists, 
although systematic cross-cultural comparison to date has been overwhelmingly 
structured around the contrast between so-called “individualistic” and “collectiv-
istic” cultures, with one of the more oft-repeated findings being that happiness in 
the latter context (paradigmatically East Asia) is more a matter of collective wel-
fare, social harmony, or fulfilling one’s duties than it is of individual achievement, 
sensory pleasures, or positive evaluations of the self (see, e.g., Lu 2010; Selin and 
Davey 2012). The emerging anthropological literature also draws attention to three 
important observations that resonate strongly with the present collection: that hap-
piness in general is best understood as intersubjective and relational (Thin 2012); 
that even pleasure, as a universal human experience, is informed by cultural expec-
tations (Clark 2009: 207); and that wellbeing throws into relief the difficulty of con-
sidering both social realities and human virtues simultaneously (Corsín Jiménez 
2008b: 180). In other words, studying happiness requires attention to the social and 
cultural as well as moral and political dimensions of human experience. 
To this end, we find it especially useful to consider happiness in relation to val-
ues, or what matters to people, in three interrelated senses. Firstly, happiness is not 
only imagined very differently across cultural contexts—and indeed within specific 
contexts by differently situated actors—but is also itself quite differently valued, 
6. Several of these authors explicitly prefer the term “wellbeing” to “happiness,” largely on 
the grounds that the former includes objective elements or measurements such as qual-
ity of life, and as such lends itself more easily to cross-cultural comparison. Happiness 
is more “experience-near,” being intrinsically linked to a person’s own evaluation of his 
or her life. 
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that is, evaluated as more or less important according to circumstances.7 In other 
words, happiness may not be an unquestionable good in every social context, let 
alone the ultimate good. Secondly, happiness is itself intrinsically evaluative. To say 
that one is happy is to make a positive evaluation or overall assessment of one’s con-
dition; typically in a way that purports to take into consideration the whole multi-
plicity of aims a person may have. Thirdly, happiness cannot therefore be separated 
from the spectrum of cultural values in relation to which it becomes meaningful, 
and which necessarily inform the process of evaluation. As the contributions to this 
collection show, a range of values may be seen to promote happiness, in the con-
ventional sense of good feeling: from peaceable sociality and the absence of worry 
to financial success or the security of one’s family. Whether these values actually 
do promote happiness is another question; and such values can also be potentially 
contradictory, as we discuss further below. 
While it can be useful and important to consider what happiness “is,” including 
how it is imagined or (in some cases, perhaps) achieved, we are equally concerned 
in this collection with how happiness “works,” or what it “does”: how it enters into 
people’s lives, leading them to choose one path over another—and what it reveals 
about those people in the process. We draw on the strengths of ethnography to 
explore how notions of happiness may give rise to or delimit possibilities for ac-
tion, entering as motives into personal projects, alongside the range of other goals, 
aspirations, or values that may together comprise specific conceptions of a life well 
lived, or worth pursuing. As such, we hope to reveal something of people’s attempts 
to create good in their lives (Robbins 2013a: 457): how people strive to make not 
only their own life happier, but also the lives of those around them, often within 
challenging or even downright hostile circumstances. 
Happiness in transit: Scope, virtue, responsibility
The currently dominant conception in the West considers both happiness and its 
pursuit to be largely private matters. That is, happiness is best understood as an in-
terior state of an individual actor, or what one prominent spokesperson of the “new 
science of happiness” suggests can be glossed as “feeling good—enjoying life and 
wanting the feeling to be maintained” (Layard 2005: 12). This state might best be 
achieved by those same individuals, acting in their best interests, cultivating rela-
tionships with others, and so on. Yet this has not always been the dominant under-
standing, and may in fact be a relatively recent development. In the ancient world, 
7. Thus Catherine Lutz (1988: 167) observes that on the Micronesian island of Ifaluk, 
in stark contrast to those American approaches to child rearing and emotion which 
elevate happiness to an important position, the Ifaluk view happiness/excitement as 
something that must be carefully monitored and sometimes halted in children. In oth-
er, more extreme cases, individual happiness can be envisaged in direct opposition to 
broader ideals of the good life, as in the case of the Jain renouncers described by James 
Laidlaw (2005). Jainism, he argues, “devalues worldly well-being to the extent of insti-
tutionalising, and recommending for the spiritually advanced as a telos of religious life, 
the practice of fasting to death” (ibid.:158).
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happiness was understood with reference to a far broader conception of human 
flourishing, or eudaimonia, implying a relatively objective evaluation of a whole 
life, with particular reference to the practice of virtue: a happy life, simply put, was 
a life of virtue. Those who promote the modern conception point out that the two 
contrastive definitions are not necessarily in conflict; after all, as Richard Layard 
(ibid.) reminds us, doing good makes you feel good. Nevertheless, the relationship 
between eudaimonia and hedonia continues to structure many recent debates in 
the field (see also Engelke, Walker, this collection). 
The transition from the ancient conception of human flourishing to the mod-
ern understanding of happiness as an inner psychological state, a feeling or mood, 
might in some ways be understood as a gradual process of interiorization that re-
calls venerated anthropological discussions of concepts of personhood (e.g., Mauss 
[1938] 1985). There seems to be an analogy of sorts to the kinds of transformations 
often thought to have taken place whereby some idea of a distributed, relational, 
or “dividual” person, construed as constituted by her relations with others (e.g., 
Bird-David 1999), is progressively replaced by a more “modern” conception of an 
autonomous, self-contained “individual,” who is now seen to exist prior to relations 
rather than constituted by them. As Charles Taylor (1989) has made clear, insofar 
as the self is constituted in and through the taking of moral stances, such notions of 
personhood are intimately connected to ideas of the good. 
Looking back more broadly at how happiness has figured through the history 
of Western civilization, it is evident that a succession of monumental changes have 
taken place. As Darrin McMahon (2006) demonstrates in a magisterial study, the 
idea of happiness as an aim suitable for (and potentially available to) everyone—
that is, something potentially within the grasp of each individual and attainable 
largely through his or her own actions—is indeed a highly culturally specific idea 
that only came into being as late as the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. In the 
tragedies of the ancient Greeks, happiness could only be achieved through some 
miraculous, divine intervention or blessing; it was deemed to be beyond human 
agency, a matter of luck or fortune, fragile and highly contingent upon external 
conditions (Nussbaum 2001). After Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, happiness came 
to be seen as a final end (Annas 1993: 12, 39); and with the latter two thinkers in 
particular, the responsibility for happiness began to shift to human beings them-
selves—in this case, as something to be attained through virtuous behavior, and 
thus partially within one’s control. It was thus only under the stable conditions of 
small, democratic city-states, during the “Golden Age” of Periclean Athens, that 
happiness came to be envisaged as a realizable human goal. During the precarious 
conditions following the demise of the city-state, a widespread sense of insecu-
rity coincided with the popularity of the ideas of Zeno and Epicurus (S. Bok 2010: 
48). Despite their differences, both these schools emphasized personal control 
and agency, and envisaged happiness as independent of external goods: whether 
through virtuous living aligned with the natural order of the world, in the case of 
Zeno’s stoicism; or through reaching a state of tranquility, recognizing that many of 
our desires are idle or misplaced while taking pleasure in life’s simple enjoyments 
(McMahon 2006: 47–64). For the ancients since Socrates, in other words, happi-
ness was not in conflict with virtue (Annas 1993: 449) and could be expected as a 
reward for virtuous living: a possibility, even if a rare or exclusive one. 
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For Christian thinkers such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, true happiness 
was not possible in life but only in heaven (S. Bok 2010: 71), even though virtue 
remained central: “Happiness remained a telos, an end, and virtue the principal 
means to guide the way. But whereas the ancients had conceived of virtue as al-
most entirely of human striving, won only by the efforts of a happy few, Christians 
understood virtue as a divine gift, obtainable, in theory, by all” (McMahon 2006: 
137). A much later formulation, a modern one, drew from these ideas the prom-
ise of universal deliverance attainable for all, as well as the notion of human re-
sponsibility for one’s own happiness. In the eighteenth century, these ideas came 
together to form a particular vision of happiness as something all people deserved 
(ibid.: 230). At the same time, its connection to virtue weakened. This gave rise to 
a more receptive attitude toward good feeling and pleasure, with significant long-
term consequences. Some thinkers of the time, including those utilitarians inter-
ested in “the greatest happiness of the greatest number,” attempted to resist the 
dissociation of happiness and virtue. John Stuart Mill, for example, whose work is 
often considered to be more subtle than Bentham’s calculus, includes virtue among 
the pleasures, along with music and health (Nussbaum 2010: 85). Nevertheless, the 
connection between the two did not arise naturally from their system of thought, 
but rested instead on “the moral capital of the past” (McMahon 2006:230). The 
incongruity to which this gave rise was addressed explicitly by Kant, who saw hap-
piness—already understood by that time as pleasure or good feeling—as opposed 
to both reason and morality (Annas 1993: 449). In Kant’s words, “Making someone 
happy is quite different from making him good” (1996: 90). 
Once the ties of happiness to virtue were no longer seen as binding, many 
thinkers (Tocqueville, for instance) considered the pursuit of individual happi-
ness—through focusing on private pleasure and wealth, for example—as being in 
tension with the wider social good, and perhaps ultimately damaging for the actual 
realization of happiness (McMahon 2006: 341). We thus arrive at the modern con-
ception of happiness, and with it the particular range of concerns most debated by 
happiness scholars today, particularly those with an interest in applying happiness 
research to public policy. 
If we now consider this (necessarily schematic) historical overview in light of 
the existing comparative literature on happiness across cultures, as well as the con-
tributions to this collection, some key themes emerge which are of particular in-
terest in formulating an anthropological approach to happiness. In particular, we 
suggest that happiness can be considered as a triangulation of scope, virtue, and 
responsibility: three axes, as it were, along which the concept varies in significant 
ways, and in relation to which it may be apprehended and interrogated. 
Firstly, then, the scope of happiness is always constrained or delimited in some 
way, such that we may usefully ask who can hope or even expect to be happy, and 
to what extent, and why. It is noteworthy that the ancient Greek conception of 
happiness as dependent on good luck and fortune, or favorable external circum-
stances, is also found in many other parts of the world (see, e.g., Lu 2001; da Col 
and Humphreys 2010); and that the English term “happy” is apparently used far 
more loosely—and is thus potentially more accessible as a condition—than its 
equivalents in other languages, including Polish, Russian, German, and French 
(Wierzbicka 2004; see also Oishi et al. 2013). Among the Amazonian Urarina, 
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anyone can achieve the ideal state of tranquility, though it is rarely lasting (Walker, 
this collection). Most migrants from Sylhet in Bangladesh consider happiness at-
tainable, even if their expectations are not fulfilled all that often (see Gardner, this 
collection); though happiness seems destined always to elude the young militiamen 
from Guinea-Bisseau (Vigh, this collection). What is more, the scope of happiness 
can also vary in terms of pertaining primarily to an individual or a group. It is 
clearly the former on Yap—hence its ambivalence (Throop, this collection)—while 
among people of the Gamo Highlands in Ethiopia, happiness is inconceivable in 
isolation and arguably pertains to the group as a whole (Freeman, this collection). 
Secondly, happiness always stands in a particular relationship to virtue: for in-
stance, as the goal of virtuous action, or as its precondition; or as severed from 
virtue altogether. This relationship lies at the heart of at least two crucial questions: 
What kind of life will bring happiness? And, how is happiness morally evaluated? 
One has the impression that the life of the retired Swiss farmer Willi discussed 
by Lambek (this collection) was a happy one largely because it was characterized 
by virtuous activity. Similarly, for British humanists, virtue—or being “good with-
out God”—is central to how they understand the promise of (secular) happiness 
(Engelke, this collection). On the other hand, virtue scarcely enters into the cal-
culations of the young Guinea-Bissau militiamen in pursuit of hedonic pleasure 
(Vigh, this collection); while happiness is in tension with virtue on the island of Yap 
insofar as it impedes attunement to the suffering of others (Throop, this collection). 
Thirdly, happiness implicates specific forms of responsibility. It raises the ques-
tion of who is responsible for the happiness of whom, and in what ways they may be 
held accountable. The notion that individuals are responsible for their own happi-
ness is without doubt one of the most politically significant features of the modern 
conception, and goes some way toward accounting for its embrace by the purveyors 
of neoliberalism. For the British humanists described by Engelke in this collection, 
assuming full responsibility for one’s own happiness in the here and now is crucial 
for living well, and for creating purpose in life. In other contexts, emphasis may be 
placed on the duty to care for the happiness of others. It is widely maintained that 
East Asian conceptions of happiness in particular are deeply social and relational 
and may have little to do with individual achievement (Kitayama and Markus 2000; 
Kan, Karasawa and Kitayama 2009). Like the collectivism/individualism dichoto-
my itself, this may be an oversimplification, especially in a contemporary context 
of rapid individualization and changing social values. As Stafford shows (this col-
lection), some Chinese today are struggling with the issue of whose happiness they 
should strive for: whether their own, that of their aging parents, or their children. 
Moreover, they must deal with the fact that while Chinese parents are still expected 
to take some responsibility for the marriage choices of their children, they may be 
no less successful at forecasting the future happiness of their children than they are 
at forecasting their own. 
The issue of responsibility is also in many ways at the core of Hannah Arendt’s 
analysis of that crucial moment of transition in which the right to the pursuit of hap-
piness was inscribed in the framing of the American Constitution. Arendt ([1963] 
1999) argues that the original concern of the founders was squarely with “public 
happiness,” an eminently political conception associated above all with participa-
tion in public affairs, or an individual’s laying claim to public power—in recognition 
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of the fact that people could not be altogether “happy” if their happiness was located 
and enjoyed only in private life. This soon gave way, however, to the later concern 
with “private happiness,” associated with the rights of subjects to be protected by the 
government. Arendt laments what she describes as “the conversion of the citizen 
of the revolutions into the private individual of nineteenth-century society . . . this 
disappearance of the ‘taste for political freedom’ as the withdrawal of the individual 
into an ‘inward domain of consciousness’ where it finds the only appropriate re-
gion of human liberty” (ibid.: 140). Yet whereas Arendt saw the currently dominant 
“private” conception of happiness as depoliticized, we would argue that it is in fact 
eminently political, albeit indicative of a different kind of politics.
The commensurability of values
Happiness researchers working in or influenced by the utilitarian tradition take 
happiness to be the greatest good and ultimate end of life. From the perspective of 
the utilitarian ideal of greatest happiness for the greatest number, the concept itself 
is relatively unproblematic, being closely associated with pleasurable feeling, and 
constituting the one “ultimate goal that enables us to judge other goals by how they 
contribute to it” (Layard 2005: 113). In other words, happiness offers a single, ulti-
mate good that can be measured and under which all other goods may effectively 
be subsumed. Yet as we have just seen in considering the history of the idea of hap-
piness in Western civilization alone—and as the articles in this collection show in 
a comparative, contemporary context—the notion of happiness as the ultimate end 
or highest value has hardly been undisputed.8 Indeed, some scholars—Amartya 
Sen among them—have raised important questions about how we should judge 
the goodness of human lives, and in particular whether other key concerns, such as 
freedom, can really be seen as subsidiary to utility (or happiness), as relevant only 
insofar as they determine or enhance it.9 
8. Bentham identified happiness with pleasure, considered to be homogeneous and dif-
fering only in duration and quantity, whereas Mill (whose ideas are somewhat closer to 
those of Aristotle) considered pleasures as differing not only in quantity and duration, 
but also in kind or quality, thus distinguishing between “higher” and “lower” pleasures. 
According to Nussbaum (2010: 85), it is this latter approach that forms the basis of 
the most modern discussions of pleasure among philosophers. Layard (2005) rejects 
as faulty the distinction between qualitatively different pleasures, or what he refers to 
as the happiness of experiences, arguing that certain kinds of pleasures have a more 
long-term effect on our happiness, while others only increase our happiness short-
term. He rejects as paternalistic any qualitative differentiation of pleasures that results 
in enumeration of goods: “We ought never to say: this is good for you, even though it 
will never make you or others feel better. On the contrary, if we want to measure the 
quality of life it must be based on how people feel” (ibid.: 113). This is a powerful and 
persuasive argument, and its apparent simplicity makes it an appealing tool for public 
policy. 
9. Sen (2009) questions the claim that happiness is the supreme good and ultimate goal 
because it alone is self-evidently good, arguing that how people feel should not neces-
sarily be the ultimate yardstick, given people’s well-documented abilities to adapt to 
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The argument for value pluralism—that there may be many different values 
held dear to people and that they are not necessarily commensurable, as they make 
different demands on us and thus cannot be reduced to a common medium of plea-
sure or utility—has been made forcefully by Isaiah Berlin, among others. This cri-
tique can be situated within a broader philosophical debate around value, one that 
has recently begun to attract greater anthropological attention. A central question 
concerns the relationship between the multiple values held in high regard, whether 
across social groups or within them: whereas monists argue that values can be seen 
as working harmoniously together—either because they can be subsumed under a 
higher value or because the important values support each other—pluralists tend 
to see them as fundamentally at odds, as some values may preclude pursuing oth-
ers seen as of equal worth (Robbins 2013b: 100). It should come as no surprise that 
many anthropologists, deeply concerned with cultural specificity, find their posi-
tion to be closer to value pluralism, and may feel discomfort at suggestions of any 
one value being a universal metavalue or ultimate end. Nevertheless, as suggested 
by recent anthropological discussions around the topic (e.g., Graeber 2001, 2013; 
Lambek 2008; Otto and Willerslev 2013; Robbins 2013b), the debate itself remains 
unresolved, and neither side can easily be dismissed.10 
Value pluralism rests on an assumption that certain values are simply irreconcil-
able. Berlin was concerned that if the highest values of different people are at odds, 
then conflict may be inevitable; his suggestion recalls a more general statement 
by Weber that “the various value spheres [or values] of the world stand in irrec-
oncilable conflict with each other” (1946: 147, cited in Robbins 2013b: 100). The 
articles in this collection, however, point to a different conclusion: while it may be 
difficult to endorse the possibility of any universal metavalue that allows for recon-
ciliation of all lower values, the position that irreconcilability implies conflict is an 
oversimplification. We propose that values may well be incommensurable, and yet 
not stand in any direct conflict. In the everyday world of practical ethics, people 
routinely make judgments involving incommensurable values in a straightforward, 
formal, or schematic manner. 
Instructive here is Michael Lambek’s (2008) work on virtue and value, which 
argues that while economic values rest on an assumption of commensurability, 
ethical values are incommensurable and subject to judgment rather than choice. 
Nevertheless, historically speaking, 
it is the nature of society, culture, or mind to posit or require some 
absolute standard of value or a meta-value that could provide a sound 
and universal measure of things. . . . There is a dialectic in human history 
between establishing absolute values against which everything else is 
hardship, and that they may have good reason to subject their own positive feelings to 
critical scrutiny. He nevertheless acknowledges that the achievement of other things 
that people may value may influence their sense of happiness, because people take plea-
sure in success in achieving their objectives; and that happiness can thus have indica-
tive merit insofar as it reveals whether people are succeeding or failing to get what they 
value and have reason to value. 
10. For example, Ronald Dworkin (2011) has recently made a forceful case for the unity of 
value. 
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relative and to be measured, hence rendered commensurable to one 
another, and discovering things that render those absolutes relative in 
turn. (Lambek 2008: 147)
In most societies there is a pressure to establish some overarching value as the ul-
timate one, even though, historically, these values do not remain uncontested. Two 
important lessons can be drawn from these observations. Firstly, the incommensu-
rability of values need not imply total conflict, or the impossibility of communica-
tion or translation between them; it presents instead a “partial barrier” that can be 
navigated daily through judgment. In bringing the focus back to everyday moral 
practice and decision making, this point is echoed by several contributions to this 
collection (Freeman, Stafford, Vigh, among others). Secondly, economic values are 
by definition commensurable, and market logic calls for commensurability across 
different spheres of social life. This insight is important, because it goes to the very 
heart of the question of why happiness has received such extraordinary attention 
across the social sciences over the past decade or so. We suggest that as monetary 
value became increasingly problematic as the basis for this market commensurabil-
ity, happiness has proved appealing to many because it appears to offer, in the form 
of an ultimate end, precisely such commensurability. In other words, it is because 
of its potential for translating across apparently diverse ends that happiness as a 
metavalue has proved so powerful and alluring, while at the same time remaining 
thoroughly embedded in—even further entrenching—a market logic. 
Opposing the utilitarian conception of happiness as the highest end, a force-
ful argument for the multiplicity of values has recently been made by Robert and 
Edward Skidelsky (2012). These authors list seven basic goods (health, security, 
dignity, personality, friendship, harmony with nature, and leisure)—notably ex-
cluding happiness, at least in the modern sense of a pleasant state of mind, which 
they argue is not a good in itself, as everything depends on what one is happy about. 
In this way, they effectively seek to renew the link between happiness and virtue. 
They emphatically defend their substantive account of the good life against the 
charge that it is potentially paternalistic, or even dangerous, by directly challenging 
the liberal assumption of “neutrality”: the assumption that policy makers should re-
frain from making positive statements about the way people should live, or creating 
policies with positive content, on the grounds that doing so leads to authoritarian-
ism. It is the legacy of John Rawls, in particular, that only those principles necessary 
for people of different tastes and ideals to live together harmoniously should be 
embodied and promoted by a liberal state. The Skidelskys argue that this neutrality 
is largely fictional: “A ‘neutral’ state simply hands power to the guardians of capital 
to manipulate public taste in their own interests” (ibid.: 12). The refusal to state val-
ues clearly, in other words, fosters policies that are far from neutral in consequence. 
Rather than the value pluralism represented by the Skidelskys, it is value monism 
that has been most closely associated with the danger of slipping into authoritari-
anism (Robbins 2013b: 102). Outside this particular debate, happiness discourse in 
economics and policy making may have acquired such power and prominence pre-
cisely because of the way it manages to evade both of these issues. It promises a uni-
fied value—the translatability and uniformity so very useful for policy making and 
measurement—while avoiding substantive claims about the nature or content of 
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happiness, which is often defined simply in subjective terms. Whereas it could well 
be argued that the major flaw of this discourse is its conceptual emptiness, it must 
be remembered that this is precisely what makes it so versatile, flexible, and, ulti-
mately, more powerful. Metavalues in general, as anthropology has taught us, are 
most effective when they are not clearly defined. As Lambek observes in relation to 
religious values: “Rappaport argued that . . . [they] do their work best when they are 
stripped of informational content and specificity. Ultimate sacred postulates like 
‘God is one’ may be deeply meaningful to their adherents but they are effective and 
enduring because they are referentially empty and unfalsifiable” (Lambek 2008: 
144). We propose that “happiness,” as it currently figures in the rising discourse of 
happiness studies, acquires its power precisely from its elusive definition. 
Happiness as a moral mood
Are moral considerations external to happiness? Is there a conflict, in other words, 
between what it is morally right to do, and what is conducive to one’s happiness? 
Or does happiness necessarily include, even depend on, being virtuous or morally 
upright? Insofar as happiness is considered to be a mood, feeling, or emotion, it 
has been relatively isolated from considerations of morality in recent work. Some 
of the reasons for this were touched upon above: the decoupling of happiness and 
virtue led to a view of the former as standing in tension with the wider social good. 
For some thinkers—most notably Kant—there is necessarily a conflict, in decid-
ing what to do, between one’s own happiness and the demands of morality. Within 
psychology, while researchers have been eager to emphasize the importance for in-
dividual happiness of rich social relationships, happiness (unlike, say, gratitude) is 
not considered to be prosocial; instead it is thought to occur primarily when (good) 
things happen to the self.11 It can also occur when good things happen to another, 
although such reactions seem to require a prior social relationship, as when one is 
happy for a friend’s success. 
Nevertheless, according to some philosophers at least (Max Scheler for in-
stance), happiness can be an affective motive of moral action. Ethnographically, 
there seems to be a close relationship between happiness and the interests of others. 
Among the Pintupi of Australia, for example, to be happy is to be shown affection 
and concern, and to show it to others. Because people represent their happiness 
as deriving from relations with “relations,” there is in fact a very close connection 
between what it means to be among “kin,” to be related, and to be “happy” (Myers 
1979). Several of the contributions to this collection would similarly suggest that 
people are indeed often happiest precisely when they are attuned to others (see also 
Thin 2012). Successfully managing one’s moral obligations may in fact be crucial 
for happiness: as among the Kuranko of Sierra Leone, for whom wellbeing is de-
scribed as “dependent on an adjustment or balance between our sense of what we 
owe others and what we owe ourselves” (Jackson 2011: 195). After all, as Jarrett 
11. Some studies focusing on the effects of happiness on decision making even indicate 
that positive moods correlate with less generous or empathetic behaviors, or a higher 
degree of selfishness (Tan and Forgas 2010). 
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Zigon and Jason Throop put it, “a good deal of moral experience is about the care 
of relations,” or what they term “being-together-with” (2014: 9).
The extent to which pleasure and virtue conflict, or reinforce each other, is a 
largely empirical question—still unresolved—that anthropology is perhaps unique-
ly well situated to answer. In any case, the contributions to this collection converge 
in suggesting that “real” happiness is not only highly relational—subsisting in the 
affective dimension of social relationships—but other-oriented. The direct pursuit 
of one’s own individual happiness very often fails (e.g., Vigh, Stafford, this collec-
tion); on the other hand, in those cases where some form of happiness is actually 
achieved, it is often a result of actions carried out either for or by others (e.g., Engel-
ke, Freeman, Walker, this collection). The pursuit of happiness, we might conclude, 
is best left in the hands of those who care for us. 
Temporalities
A final, though no less important, dimension of happiness concerns its temporality, 
or orientation in relation to the perception and social organization of time. Happi-
ness clearly allows for multiple temporal vantage points: someone’s overall condi-
tion could be evaluated at a particular moment in time, over a stretch of his or her 
life, or over that life as a whole (the perspectives taken by, respectively, Kavedžija, 
Vigh, and Lambek in this collection, for example). Happiness can also contain 
within it both long-term and short-term components (Walker, Robbins, this col-
lection)—while the sources of happiness may themselves change dramatically over 
time, even over the space of just a few years (Freeman, this collection). A further 
key issue may be, as Lambek (this collection) puts it, “the way the temporal and the 
ethical dimensions intertwine.”
Happiness is sometimes seen as pertaining to the distant past, imbuing memo-
ries of past times or events; or as located in the future, something for which one 
hopes or strives. Alternatively, it may be construed as immanent and immediate: as 
the British humanists profess, “the time to be happy is now” (Engelke, this collec-
tion). Wherever it is temporally located, happiness seems closely linked to a sense 
of “right orientation,” a feeling that one is headed in the right direction. Of course, 
this allows for the distinct possibility that when people get what they want, they 
may cease to be happy (Bruckner 2011). Happiness can function as a powerful 
source of motivation, one that shapes the way people’s lives are oriented toward cer-
tain horizons and not others. This may be true even when the pursuit of happiness 
itself becomes a kind of moral duty, as it arguably has in the modern West. To the 
extent that happiness is future-oriented, and to the extent that people’s actions may 
be seen as motivated by this goal of future happiness, it is particularly interesting to 
consider the emerging body of work by psychologists demonstrating that humans 
are exceedingly poor at predicting what will make them happy, or, more precisely, 
how happy some given event or thing will actually make them in the future (Gilbert 
2007; see also Stafford, this collection). Moreover, according to a number of stud-
ies conducted across widely different social contexts, people are surprisingly resil-
ient in the sense that their self-proclaimed happiness levels remain relatively stable 
throughout their lives (D. Bok 2010). Even life-changing events, both positive and 
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negative, affect their subjective wellbeing only temporarily, and it soon restabilizes 
at its “default” level. How, then, should we account for the wide range of actions 
ostensibly motivated by the pursuit of happiness, but which rarely if ever result 
in its achievement? The rational choice theory favored by economists (not far re-
moved from utilitarianism) can only discount these efforts as misguided, based 
on the faulty reasoning to which humans are regrettably prone (Kahneman and 
Thaler 2006: 221). Our position, by contrast, is that studying these motivations 
in a broader sense involves placing the values of happiness alongside other those 
values seen as comprising or leading to it, as well as those seen as equally if not 
more important. It is in this way that we can understand the risky, reckless, and 
often futile pursuits of happiness of the young militiamen described by Vigh (this 
collection), for example; or the migration stories of young people from Bangladesh, 
as described by Gardner (this collection), whose expectations are not infrequently 
frustrated in their pursuit of a better life. 
One question that arises, both philosophically and practically, is whether there 
is anything “real” about happiness. If it always “illusive” (Vigh, this collection), or 
imagined, endlessly deferred, and elusive when pursued outright (Gardner, this 
collection), where is it located? Happiness, we might suggest, provides a sense of 
orientation; like a horizon it delimits a space of action and understanding, even as 
it recedes from view. Situational and contingent, it brings some things into focus 
while occluding others, and adds a sense of depth to the mundane and everyday. As 
Hans-Georg Gadamer observed, speaking of historical consciousness: “To acquire 
a horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is close at hand – not in order 
to look away from it but to see it better” ([1975] 2006: 304). 
The elusive or virtual quality of happiness would not make it any less real in 
its consequences, or capacity to orient people’s actions. In many contexts, happi-
ness may be seen as a worthwhile aim; in others it may be seen as lowly, selfish, or 
in competition with other values. Some of these evaluations will inevitably affect 
the way people direct their actions and imagine their futures. In contexts where 
happiness is valued highly, as in the West, the objects and aims with which it is as-
sociated will themselves typically be evaluated highly. This is what Ahmed (2010) 
calls the “promise of happiness”: if you do “this,” happiness will ensue. Conversely, 
“this” must therefore be good; and “you,” as the kind of being who is guided by it, 
must therefore be good too. We can thus read Ahmed’s observation as suggesting a 
crucial link between the temporality (and futurity) of happiness and its valuation. 
Depending on the values of happiness, as they stand in relation to other values, the 
social world takes its form: people’s actions, plans, and motivations are offered to 
them along with their moral consequences. 
Conclusion
One of the central challenges of anthropology is to recognize the potential diversity 
of human ends and to understand and interpret how people strive collectively to 
reach a balance between the different ends they value. These need not be commen-
surable, and may require a continuous exercise of moral judgment (Kavedžija, this 
collection); they may not all point to happiness. And yet, happiness seems strikingly 
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well suited as a starting point for inquiring into what gives lives a sense of purpose 
or direction, or how people search for the best way to live—even in dire and hostile 
circumstances. For happiness is often something to be achieved—or not—by liv-
ing a life of one kind or another. In contemplating the diversity of images revealed 
through ethnographic inquiry, we have suggested that happiness might usefully 
be considered in terms of questions of scope, virtue, and responsibility. Happiness 
may not always be seen as available to everyone, nor need it even be considered the 
property of a single individual; on the contrary, it may be construed as part of the 
uninterrupted flow of social life, an inherently relational quality not reducible to 
an individual person. Moreover, happiness always stands in a particular relation-
ship to ideas of virtue, and at a greater or lesser distance from it; just as it always 
implicates specific forms of responsibility: who, ultimately, is responsible for the 
happiness of whom, and in what ways they may be held accountable. 
Happiness always involves an evaluation of sorts: of one’s condition at a mo-
ment in time, or of a life as a whole, or of several interpenetrating lives. As such, it 
is intrinsically linked to questions of value, both in terms of the cultural values that 
inform and enable the process of arriving at a positive assessment; and in terms of 
how happiness is itself evaluated in relation to that multiplicity of aims, desires, or 
experiences that may comprise one’s conception of a full, good, or meaningful life. 
On the island of Yap, for example, happiness is less socially valued than suffering, 
which elicits empathic concern (Throop, this collection), while in the Ethiopian 
Gamo Highlands, by contrast, suffering is seen as unnecessary misery, whereas 
happiness consists of smooth and peaceful social relations—formerly achieved 
through the constant joking and interaction which ensured “present moment 
consciousness” and discouraged isolation, though increasingly through Pentecos-
tal religious gatherings (Freeman, this collection). A different sense of changing 
values in China, and competing visions of family life, call into question the rela-
tive importance of individual and family happiness, as well as different possible 
evaluations of progress and material prosperity (Stafford, this collection). Among 
Japanese elderly, happiness can only be understood in relation to values of social-
ity, self-development, and responsibility to others (Kavedžija, this collection), while 
for British humanists, happiness involves a shared commitment to the Enlighten-
ment values of secular reason (Engelke, this collection). Happiness is bound up in 
the values of connectivity for Bengali migrants (Gardner, this collection), and in 
flexible, self-directed work, freedom from trouble, and the cultivation of a “style of 
life” for the Peruvian Urarina (Walker, this collection). For the retired Swiss dairy 
farmer Willi, it is his adhesion to the values of hard work and political engage-
ment that underpins his achievement of a happy life (Lambek, this collection). For 
young militiamen in Guinnea-Bissau, happiness is closely related to social worth 
and status, or “becoming somebody,” along with the values of stability and solidar-
ity (Vigh, this collection). 
An ethnographically grounded inquiry into happiness directs attention to what 
actually matters to people, or what gives life a sense of meaning and purpose, and 
it does so in a number of useful ways. To be clear, the answer to such a question of 
what matters most need not always be happiness, at least not in the sense of a pur-
suit of sustained good feeling. Our suggestion is rather that asking after happiness 
and its valences can offer a powerful way of understanding how diversely situated 
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people grapple with fundamental questions of how to live, questions of value, mo-
tivation, and purpose; how they negotiate and reconcile their obligations to others 
with their sense of duty to themselves; and how they imagine their future, includ-
ing how it feeds into their present and becomes their past. If value brings universes 
into being (Graeber 2013), the values of happiness go some way toward constitut-
ing the worlds of lived moral, political, and emotional experience, and an examina-
tion of those values may reveal to us their outlines and contours. We hope readers 
will find in the essays that follow a sense of worlds both familiar and unfamiliar. 
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Valeurs et bonheur
Résumé : La manière dont les gens conçoivent le bonheur en dit long sur ce qu’ils 
sont et sur leurs valeurs. La conception actuelle du bonheur comme un sentiment 
de bien-être individuel est le résultat d’une séquence de changements dans les 
conceptions dominantes des buts d’une vie et de la place de l’humanité dans le cos-
mos. Cela donne a réfléchir: il semble en effet que le caractère vague du bonheur 
explique sa capacité a rendre différentes valeurs commensurables. En défendant 
l’importance d’une approche critique et ethnographique du bonheur - qui s’éloigne 
d’une approche centré sur la mesure du bonheur et cherche plutôt à analyser où le 
bonheur figure en tant qu’idée, humeur ou motivation dans la vie quotidienne - 
nous plaçons au premier plan sa relation aux valeurs, à des questions d’échelle, de 
vertu, et de responsabilité. Qu’elle soit concrète ou difficile a saisir, la poursuite du 
bonheur structure le temps de manière spécifique et ouverte vers autrui, dans la 
mesure où notre propre bonheur est parfois dans de meilleurs mains lorsque qu’il 
n’est pas dans les nôtres.   
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